Constitutionality of Directed Verdicts by Talley, Jean
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 30 | Number 3
April 1970
Constitutionality of Directed Verdicts
Jean Talley
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Jean Talley, Constitutionality of Directed Verdicts, 30 La. L. Rev. (1970)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol30/iss3/7
NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIRECTED VERDICTS
At the close of the state's evidence, the defendant, alleging
there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to warrant send-
ing the case to the jury, moved for a directed verdict which the
trial court denied. Defendant appealed from this adverse deci-
sion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied jurisdiction to
decide the question on the grounds that to do so would be an in-
vasion of the jury's function as trier of facts. Of particular in-
terest here, the court went further and declared the directed
verdict provision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
unconstitutional, since the Louisiana Constitution limits the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to questions of law in
criminal cases. State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969).
Article 778 of The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that in jury trials, the court may direct a verdict of not
guilty "on its own motion or on that of a defendant, after the
close of the state's evidence, . . . if the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a conviction."' While it could be maintained that the
Hudson holding that article 788 is unconstitutional was dictum,
the majority's strong language left no doubt as to its intent. The
court found it to be a question involving its jurisdiction, thus
justifying its striking down the provision as unconstitutional on
its own motion: 2
"Finding that the sufficiency of evidence touching upon guilt
or innocence can only be decided by the jury, we hold that
the trial judge cannot decide that question and we cannot
consider the sufficiency of evidence on appeal. To do so would
amount to an unconstitutional extension of our jurisdic-
tion."8 (Emphasis added.)
In reaching its decision the court found that the state had a
constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions equal
to that same protection extended to defendants. It will be shown
that this is erroneous and can be dismissed as a valid reason for
1. In the federal courts, the motion for a directed verdict has been
replaced by the motion for a judgment of acquittal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
2. Three justices dissented because they felt deciding the constitutional
question was unnecessary, unauthorized, and improper. Only the year before
the court dealt with the same problem in State v. Hochenedel, 253 La. 263,
217 So.2d 392 (1968). There the court, without discussing the constitutional-
ity of the provision, simply stated it could not pass on the sufficiency of the
evidence.
3. State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 1023, 221 So. 484, 500 (1969).
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striking down the Louisiana directed verdict provision. The Lou-
isiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure provide that
offenses which are not capital or necessarily punishable by hard
labor may be tried by the judge alone if the defendant elects to
waive his right to trial by jury.4 If the court follows its reason-
ing in Hudson, this long-standing practice in the administration
of criminal justice must be held to be unconstitutional as an in-
vasion of the state's supposed right to a trial by jury, since the
state has no part in the waiver decision. This proposition is
clearly untenable. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly pointed out that the constitutional right to a trial
by jury5 is designed to protect the accused from oppression by
the governments and not, as the Louisiana Supreme Court states
in Hudson, to protect the state's prosecutors from a possible ad-
verse decision by the trial judge.
Any critical analysis of the instant decision must take into
account the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
Duncan v. Louisiana,7 which extended to the states the United
States constitutional requirement of trial by jury in most crimi-
nal cases. The test set forth by Duncan to be used in determin-
ing if a particular constitutional right binding in the federal
system should be applied to the states is whether it is "funda-
mental-whether, that is, a particular procedure is necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." In clarifying this
test the Court observed that to be applied to the states, a particu-
lar device did not have to be fundamentally fair in every criminal
system imaginable but "fundamental in the context of criminal
processes maintained by the American states."9
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that the de-
fendant's right to trial by jury would be more accurately de-
scribed as a right to trial by a controlled jury.10 In Singer v.
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9, art. VII, § 41, art. VII, § 42; LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 780.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9; id. amend. VI.
6. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24 (1965); United States ex tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
7. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
8. Id. at 149.
9. Id.
10. Among the many controls on the jury which the Court has decided to
be so fundamental to justice that they have been applied to the states are
the following: exclusion of evidence seized in illegal searches and seizures
(Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); state prosecutors may not comment on
the defendant's failure to testify because to do so might prejudice the jury
against him (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). It has frequently been
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United States the Court stated that "trial by jury has its weak-
nesses and potential for misuse. However, the mode itself has
been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible."1 1
The application to the states of the sixth amendment require-
ment of trial by jury in criminal cases by Duncan will certainly
mean that many of the inherent controls on the jury in the federal
system must now be used in the conduct of state criminal prose-
cutions. 12 It will be shown that the directed verdict is one of the
most basic of these controls.
The Duncan Court observed that the structure and style of
criminal processes used throughout the United States are not
imaginery theoretical schemes, but actual systems bearing vir-
tually every characteristic of the common law system which has
developed in England and this country.18 While the directed ver-
dict appears to be a relatively modern device, it is the result to
the evolution of a very ancient jury-control procedure. The di-
rected verdict more than meets the Duncan "fundamental" test;
it is so inherent in the concept of trial by jury that it should be
viewed as a right of which the criminal defendant should not
be deprived by the states.
The origins of Anglo-American criminal proceeding are
closely interrelated with and have frequently grown out of the
development in civil procedures; it is, therefore, necessary to ex-
amine both.1 4 One of the earliest of jury controls was the at-
taint, which was used from the end of the thirteenth century to
punish jurors who returned a "false verdict." The penalty was
severe-imprisonment, forfeiture of lands and goods, and evic-
tion of jurors' families from their homes. In criminal cases mem-
bers of a jury who found a prisoner not guilty in the face of
held that juries cannot be trusted to not consider prejudicial effects of illegal
evidence after instructions by the court to disregard it (Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See
also, concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1948)). Cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963), the jury trial conducted was
held to be a hollow formality since the entire community including members
of the jury had seen the defendant's televised confessions and had been
undoubtedly prejudiced against him.
11. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965). For an interesting dis-
cussion of the evolution of controls used by the courts on the jury, see L.
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 375-81 (1930).
12. An analogous situation existed in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), where the court, citing Duncan as authority, applied the entire fed-
eral standards on double jeopardy to the states.
13. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
14. 1 J. STEVENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 506 (1883); 1. 3. CHrrTy,
CRIMINAL LAW 381 (1819).
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court opposition were fined or imprisoned. In the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Star Chamber gave the same penalty to any jury which
handed down a verdict it deemed to be contrary to the evidence.
The harshness of these remedies caused them to be gradually
replaced and other means were utilized to exercise a degree of
control over juries.15
Almost since the advent of the modern jury, the law has au-
thorized procedures by which the court could withdraw from the
jury the determination of questions of law. At early common
law these procedures were the demurrer to the evidence and the
compulsory nonsuit.'l Later practices and statutes added another
control-binding instructions on the law from the court to the
jury." Certainly, the oldest of these devices is the demurrer
upon evidence, 8 the first reported use of which occurred in 1456
in Tikford v. Caldwell.19 This interesting contrivance had the ef-
fect of withdrawing from the jury all consideration of the facts
and submitting to the court a question of law; i.e., whether the
admitted facts were sufficient, as a matter of law, to give a ver-
dict to the party who submitted the evidence. 20 The term and
form came to be used in some American jurisdictions as the prac-
tical equivalent of a directed verdict based on insufficiency of
evidence. 21 The United States Supreme Court early recognized
that the directed verdict is equivalent to the ancient demurrer
to evidence: "Hence, the practice of granting an instruction.. ,
which makes it imperative upon the jury to find a verdict for
the defendant . . .has in many states superseded that ancient
15. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 341-42 (7th ed. 1956).
16. 5 F. Busch, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 614 (1963).
17. Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICE. L.
REv. 555, 568 (1945).
18. See Comment, 44 MIcH. L. RPv. 468 (1945) for a survey of the use of
demurrers upon evidence.
19. Y.B. 34 Hen. VI, f. 36, pl. 7 (1456). 5 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN
JUnY TRIALS § 615 (1963); Comments, 44 MICH. L. Rv. 468 (1945), 70 YALm L.J.
1151 (1961). An example of the operation of the demurrer is the case of
Robert Newis and his Wife Scolastica v. Lark and Hunt. The defendants
admitted as true all evidence presented by the opposing parties, but main-
tained it was insufficient for a conviction. Their opponents joined in the
admission (a necessity for the demurrer to be effective) but asserted the
evidence was sufficient. The court in that case explained "a demurrer upon
evidence goes to the law upon the matter, and not to the truth of the
fact, for it admits that to be true but denies the operation of law thereupon."
2 Pl. Com. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609, 620 (1571); Blume, Origin and Development
of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. REV. 555, 561-62 (1945).
20. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
234 (1898). See also, 5 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 342 (1963).
21. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940).
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practice of a demurrer to evidence. It answers the same purpose
and should be tested by the same rules. 22
Another jury control in which elements of the directed ver-
dict can be seen is the involuntary nonsuit. When the plaintiff
failed to prove his case by not adducing evidence to support it,
he could be nonsuited, or put out of court. In contrast to the
directed verdict or the demurrer to evidence, the nonsuit merely
dismissed the action; it did not carry a final judgment. Judges
directed a nonsuit when it was clear that the action would not lie.
Nineteenth century cases indicated that, like the directed ver-
dict, a case could be taken from the jury only when the question
to be decided was one of law.23
A major step in the development of the modern directed
verdict occurred when the courts began to instruct the jury that
they were bound to follow the law as given to them by the
court.24 For a brief period the United States Supreme Court and
most state courts held juries to be the judges of both the facts
and the law.25 However, all those courts soon reversed that ap-
proach and brought American practice in line with the English
common law procedure of requiring judges to determine the law,
and juries, the facts.2 6 The case of United States v. Battiste27 de-
cided in 1835 "seems more effectively than any other decision to
have deflected the current of American judicial opinion away
from the recognition of the jury's right... [to decide the law.]."28
Since the decision in Sparf v. United States, it has been settled
that it is the duty of the jury in federal criminal prosecutions to
be bound by the court's instructions on all matters of law.29
22. Park v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 373 (1850). See also 5 F. BUSCH,
LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 615 (1963).
23. Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L.
REv. 555, 562-65 (1950).
24. See H. KALVEN & H. ZiSEL, THE AMERICAN JuaY ch. 33 (1966).
25. See Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH.
L. REv. 555 (1950).
26. Id.
27. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (no. 14,545) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
28. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 582, 590(1939). Sixteen years later the jury's right to decide law was even more
vigorously denied in United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No. 15,815)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
29. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956); Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135(1920); France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676 (1897); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895); Ex parte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1939);
United States v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1938); Fraina v. United
States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1918); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No.
15,815) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851); United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (No.
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It would seem that these federal standards on the relative
functions of judge and jury would be applied to the states by
the Duncan decision, since such federal determinations are now
interpretations of the scope of the sixth amendment protections.
Only two jurisdictions in the United States have constitutional
or statutory provisions which make the jury the judge of the law
and facts in criminal cases.31 In pre-Duncan decisions, when the
United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider
such provisions, the Court did not deal with their constitution-
ality,8 2 but in Brady v. Maryland"3 the Court did observe that the
Maryland provision making juries the judges of the law did not
mean precisely what it seemed to say due to statutory and ju-
dicial limitations. Since the Duncan decision, the court has not
again faced this issue. Nevertheless, it is very probable that a
post-Duncan Court would strike down such state provisions which
are contradictory to the established federal standards.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hudson did not deny that
trial courts had the power to decide questions of law. The court
did, however, state that insufficiency of evidence was a question
of fact and not law.84 This interpretation of the scope of questions
of law relative to the granting of directed verdicts is contrary to
both the history of directed verdicts and federal jurisprudence."
Insufficiency of evidence is the standard upon which directed
14,545) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835). See also Howe, Juries as Judges o Criminal
Law, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 582, 588-90 (1939).
30. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
31. Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967). The two states are
Maryland (MD. R.P. 756 § b) and Indiana (IND. CONST. art I, § 19).
32. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giles v. Maryland, 372 U.S.
767 (1963); Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
33. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
34. The court in Hudson limited its findings to directed verdicts based
on insufficiency of evidence. It may be that the court has left open the
possibility of directed verdicts for no evidence.
35. The federal courts have recognized sufficiency of evidence to be a
question of law. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Coronado
v. United States, 266 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 851 (1959);
Karn v. United States, 158 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1946); Yoffe v. United States,
153 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1946); Ex parte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (7th Mr.
1939). See also Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 227 U.S.
434 (1913); Chicago & Nw. Ry. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123 (1885); Lancaster v.
Collins, 115 U.S. 222 (1885). In Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278, 284
(1876), the Court Indicated that before the evidence Is left to the jury the
trial judge must answer -the preliminary question, not whether there is
literally no evidence, but whether there is any substantial (or sufficient)
evidence upon which the jury could properly proceed. For the development
of the directed verdict out of the demurrer to evidence, see text at notes
16-23 supra. See also text at notes 25 supra and 38-39 4nlra.
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verdicts are granted. In Ex Parte United States the United
States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared:
"The essence of legal power is to take the case away from
the jury, where there is an insufficiency of evidence to sus-
tain a conviction. The power to direct a verdict and the
power to render a judgment of dismissal pursuant to the
reservation of the legal question are clearly incidental to,
and necessarily flow from, the judicial function of deter-
mining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court has
inherent power to invoke these procedural aids in its efforts
to administer criminal justice."3 6 (Emphasis added.)
That court added that to allow a jury verdict of guilty to stand
in a case where the evidence was insufficient to send the case to
the jury would be tantamount to giving the jury permission to
invade a judicial power.8 Other federal courts have indicated
that if the evidence is insufficient the court is under a duty to
grant the motion for acquittal" and should even raise the ques-
tion of insufficiency of evidence on its own motion to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.3 9 The directed verdict based on insuffi-
ciency of evidence, as a question of law, is the type of federal
standard which needed, in the words of the Duncan Court, "are of
the sort that naturally complement jury trial and have developed
in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial."40
In any event, the decision in the instant case is unsound for
yet another reason; it constitutes a denial of the defendant's right
to have the judge make a determination of this question ,of law,
i.e., whether he is entitled to make use of this most fundamental
jury control, the directed verdict. The United States Supreme
Court in Sparf v. United States41 indicated in very strong lan-
guage it felt criminal defendants had a constitutional right to
have judges decide questions of law. It maintained that "[p]ublic
and private safety alike would be in peril" if juries determined
the law, and that judges would be reduced to merely keepers of
order "while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine
36. 101 F.2d 870, 878 (7th Cir. 1939).
37. Id. at 875.
38. France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676 (1897); Cephus v. United States,
324 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Collins v. United States, 65 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.
1933); Duff v. United States, 185 F. 101 (4th Cir. 1911); United States v.
Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Va. 1954).
39. Ansley v. United States, 135 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1943).
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 146, 150 (1968).
41. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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questions affecting life, liberty, or property . . . . Under any
other system the courts, although established in order to declare
the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from
our system of government as instrumentalities devised for the
protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential
rights."42
The instant case is an unusual one in that the Louisiana
Supreme Court here sought to limit an aspect of its constitu-
tionally derived judicial power 4 5-- one carefully protected by the
courts of other states and the federal system. The federal system
and nearly all the states have maintained the equivalent of the
directed verdict 44 without finding it to be a denial of trial by jury.
Indeed, the courts of many states have jealously protected the
directed verdict and have deemed it unconstitutional to be with-
out one.45 In those jurisdictions and others, the directed verdict
is considered a fundamental tool in the administration of crimi-
nal justice and a necessary means to protect the rights of the
accused. Where the evidence demands it, the motion for a di-
rected verdict
".. . requires that disposition of the case, as a matter of
right, which implies a judicial duty to grant it. Such dis-
position by no means trenches on the province of the jury,
but is the exercise of a judicial function, essential to the due
administration of justice. '46 (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, legislative attempts to limit this judicial power
consistently have been held unconstitutional.4 7
Regardless of the action taken in the instant case, the ques-
42. Id. at 101.
43. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 1151 (1961).
Even the earliest cases considered the judge's power to direct verdicts as
inherent in the judicial power. United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829
(No. 14,459) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873); United States v. Fullerton, 25 F. Cas. 1225
(No. 15,176) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870).
44. 5 F. BuscH, LAW AND TAC'CS IN JURY TRIALS §§ 618, 619 (1963).
45. In re White, 340 Mich. 140, 65 N.W.2d 296 (1954); Bielecki v. United
Trucking Service, Inc., 247 Mich. 661, 226 N.W. 675 (1929); Thoe v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923); Ex parte Johnston, 36
P.2d 225 (Cal. App. 2d Div. 1934).
46. Finklestn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 94 Wis. 270, 68 N.W. 1005
(1896). See also Ex parte Johnston, 36 P.2d 225 (Cal. App. 2d Div. 1934).
47. Ex parte Johnston, 36 P.2d 225 (Cal. App. 2d Div. 1934); In re White,
340 Mich. 140, 65 N.W.2d 296 (1954); Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187,
236 N.W. 222 (1931); People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723
(1930); Bielecki v. United Trucking Service, Inc., 247 Mich. 661, 226 N.W.
675 (1929); Beopple v. Mohalt, 101 Mt. 417, 54 P.2d 857 (1936); Thoe v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923).
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tion of insufficiency of evidence remains a question of law which
properly must be decided by the court. This decision deprives
a criminal defendant of his right to use, where appropriate, one
of the most fundamental of judicial procedures, the directed
verdict. That a Louisiana trial judge, exercising his discretion,4 8
can grant a new trial if he decides the verdict is unjust 49 (or, as
in the federal courts, contrary to the weight of the evidence 0 )
is no substitute for the accused's right to a directed verdict of
acquittal when, as a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient to
merit sending the case to the jury. This can be seen in that the
requirements for a judge to grant a new trial are much less strict
than those for a judge to grant a directed verdict. No defendant
should be subjected to the uncertainties of a jury trial and the
possibility of the necessity of a new trial if, as a matter of law,
he is innocent and entitled to an acquittal at the close of the
state's or all the evidence.
The Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that the court in ex-
ercising its power to review questions of law has not applied
strict standards as to what is deemed no evidence in reviewing
denials of motions for new trials.51 The court maintains that it
cannot pass on the sufficiency of evidence. Yet what has been
deemed by the court to be no evidence in some cases appears to
be insufficient evidence.5 2 The court must not shirk its duty to
48. In Louisiana, new trials are largely within the discretion of the trialjudge. State v. Thomas, 240 La. 419, 123 So.2d 872 (1960); State v. Simpson,
184 La. 190, 165 So. 708 (1936); State v. Raney, 181 La. 638, 160 So. 124 (1935);
State v. West, 172 La. 344, 134 So. 243 (1931); State v. Brannon, 133 La. 1027,
63 So. 507 (1913).
49. LA. CODE CaiM. P. art. 481. The motion for a new trial is based on the
supposition that injustice has been done the defendant. The court shall
grant a new trial when the verdict Is contrary to the law and the evidence
or the court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by
granting a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new
trial as a matter of strict legal interpretation.
50. United States v. Hurley, 281 F. Supp. 443 (Conn. 1968); United States
v. McGonigal, 214 F. Supp. 621 (Del. 1963); United States v. Pepe, 209 F.
Supp. 592 (Del. 1962); United States v. Wilson, 178 F. Supp. 881 (D.C. 1959).
51. For a comprehensive study see Comment, 19 LA. L. REv. 843 (1959).
See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-60 Term-
Criminal Law and Procedure, 21 IA. L. REv. 366, 374 (1961).
52. State v. Linkletter, 239 La. 1000, 120 So.2d 835 (1960) (facts that
defendant's car was used in the burglary and that he was associated in
business with the burglars were considered no evidence); State v. LaBorde,
234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) (court stated no evidence of any probative
value was offered which leaves the impression that some evidence was
offered); State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957) (much testimony
about the bribery occurring in defendant's department and his possible
knowledge of it was given; again the court said there was no evidence of
any probative value). Cf. Mayerhafer v. Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163
(1958) (facts very similar to Sbisa on which the court relied); State v.
NOTES
In the federal courts, decisions on motions for acquittal do
not depend upon the individualized opinion of the judge To avoid
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions on this legal question, the
courts have carefully developed standards to determine whether
the motion should be granted or denied. One rather lenient line
of cases indicates the motion should be granted when the facts
are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.5 3 Another group
demands that before the judge allows the jury to decide a case,
he must find a substantial amount of evidence from which the
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.54 A similar view
which appears to be that of the majority adopts the standard
found in Curley v. United States; the court declared that the
motion must be denied if the trial judge determined that upon
the evidence,
".. . giving full play to the right of the jury to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable infer-
ences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. .. ."5
decide all questions of law, including, where necessary, deter-
minations of the sufficiency of the evidence in granting or deny-
ing motions for directed verdicts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court should reevaluate the Hudson
decision in light of the historical background of the directed
verdict as a fundamental jury control device and promulgate
standards in light of the federal standards which have proven so
effective. The evils of inconsistency in the administration of
Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925) (defendant's confession without
other testimony considered no evidence). See also State v. Giangosso, 157 La.
360, 102 So. 429 (1924). Of. State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959);
State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945) (court declared it would
determine whether there was any legally admitted evidence at all of a fact
essential to conviction).
53. Romano v. United States, 9 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1925); Cady v. United
States, 293 F. 829 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Nosowitz v. United States, 282 F. 575
(2d Cir. 1922); Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788 (8th Cir. 1915).
54. Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1967); Blachley v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967); Maguire v. United States, 358
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1966); Cartwright v. United States, 355 F.2d 919 (10th Cir.
1964).
55. Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See Jones
v. United States, 391 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1968); Battles v. United States, 388
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1968); Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Crawford v. United States, 375 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rowe v.
United States, 570 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Stopelli, 183
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Gerhert, 275 Supp. 443 (S.D.
W.Va. 1967); United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
United States v. Long, 153 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Penn. 1957).
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justice and confusion of the functions of judge and jury would be
avoided without depriving criminal defendants of the opportunity
to have the court consider their motions for the directed verdicts
-a control device basic to trial by jury.5
Jean Talley
DISPOSITION OF WITHERSPOON-TYPE CASES
The United States Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,1
declared unconstitutional the successful challenge for cause of
prospective jurors who maintained conscientious or religious
scruples against the death penalty. Stating that the exclusion
of such persons left a jury prejudiced against the defendant on
the penalty issue, the Court voided Witherspoon's sentence of
death but affirmed his conviction of guilt. The actual disposition
of Witherspoon, however, was not clear,2 with the result that
state courts have been far from uniform in disposing of Wither-
spoon-type cases. The states have found themselves faced with
the question of what to do with defendants whose convictions
are valid, but who may no longer be executed on the basis of the
convicting jury's penalty determination. The Supreme Court of
California has affirmed the conviction of such a defendant, and
ordered a new trial on the penalty issue only under California's
existing bifurcated trial procedure.3 The other states which have
had to cope with the problem do not have statutes allowing bi-
furcated trials, and have been forced to formulate ad hoc tech-
niques. The Georgia court 4 affirmed the conviction and ordered
a new trial on the penalty issue only, stating that it had no au-
thority to enter a sentence other than death unless it had a jury
recommendation of mercy. The North Carolina Supreme Court5
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 6 on the other hand,
reversed the convictions as well as the sentences and ordered
complete new trials. The Mississippi Supreme Court 7 ordered
56. The court should take this step at the earliest possible time, since
unless the trial judge assigns as the reason for denying the directed verdict
the Hudson rationale, the defendant's motion would simply be denied with-
out recourse to effective appeal on this point.
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. Rav. 381 (1969).
2. Witherspoon apparently was never retried by an Illinois court.
3. In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968).
4. Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 730 (1968) (on habeas corpus);
Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968) (on appeal).
5. State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968) (on appeal).
6. Ex parte Bryan, 434 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (on habeas
corpus); Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (on appeal).
7. Rouse v. State, 222 So.2d 145 (Miss. 1969) (on appeal).
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